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In spite of being the second largest recipient of FDI in the world, China shows 
limited evidence of considerable FDI benefits on growth (Fan and Hu 2007; Luo 
2007; Ran et al. 2007). Motivated by Alfaro et al.’s (2003) model, this study tests 
whether poor financial market development might be responsible for the relatively 
low benefits of FDI on growth in China. We apply Blundell–Bond system GMM 
estimators to a panel of Chinese provinces. Our results indicate that poor financial 
intermediation does indeed limit the transmission of FDI benefits within the Chinese 
economy. Moreover, the study reveals preliminary evidence that banks’ credits to 
unproductive State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) constitute poor financial intermediation 
with negative growth implications. In contrast, credits to small private enterprises 
are associated with a positive impact of FDI on growth. 
JEL classification: N25, F21, F23, O11, O16
Key words: foreign direct investment, FDI spill-overs, financial development, credit 
misallocation, economic growth, China *Crawford School of Economics and Gov-
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1 Introduction
China stands as the world’s second largest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
inflows since 2006. Actual FDI inflows into China over 2007–08 were USD 112 billion. 
However a top-rank FDI recipient country China may be, its utilisation of FDI is less 
impressive. The empirical evidence of FDI-growth linkage in China is ambiguous. Some 
studies suggest positive effects of FDI on growth (Berthelemy and Demurger 2000; Yao 
2006), whereas others find insignificant relationship between FDI and growth (Luo 2007; 
Ran et al. 2007). Laurenceson and Tang (2007)’s review of the empirical evidence of 
FDI–growth nexus suggests that FDI benefits in China are much smaller than expected 
with many strong positive results largely due to the failure to address serious econometric 
issues.2 It is puzzling that a large volume of FDI delivers small impact on China. To explain 
the puzzle, many scholars suggest that FDI benefits are conditioned on host countries’ 
local conditions and underline regional disparity, infrastructure quality, and local firms’ 
learning ability being such conditions restraining FDI benefits in China (Luo 2007; Fan 
and Hu 2007; Ran et al. 2007). These are standard ‘local absorptive capacities’ prescrip-
tions (BlomstrÖm and Kokko 1998). 
  This paper provides an alternative perspective to address the weak FDI–growth re-
lationship found in China. Inspired by Alfaro et al.’s (2003) model and the understanding 
of the dilemma of Chinese financia systems, the study examines the role of the financial 
system in the FDI–growth linkage and reveals how financial market conditions could 
influence FDI benefits in China. In Alfaro et al.’s model, FDI contributes growth via 
spill-over effects on the productivity of domestic entrepreneurs. The number of domestic 
entrepreneurs able to operate (and therefore take advantage of the spill-overs from FDI) 
depends on the availability of credit and thus on the efficiency of the domestic financial 
system. A detailed review of the financial system development in China depicts an inef-
ficient financial system in terms of credit allocation. Poor financial intermediation taking 
the form of credit misallocation remains dominant practice in the Chinese banking system 
despite rapid expansion of the banking sector and the government’s continuing efforts 
on financial reforms. Hence, this observation supports the hypothesis that poor financial 
market development might be responsible for the low benefits of FDI in China.  
  The empirical analysis is characterised by several features. First, the study employs a 
unique province-level panel data-set compiled by the author. One of the major data limita-
tions associated with most of the existing finance–growth studies in China is the absence 
of private credit data (Hao 2006), because such data are not available and in many cases 
nonexistent at the provincial level. However, data on short-term credits to individual 
private enterprises, to township and village enterprises, and to foreign-owned enterprises 3
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are reported in many provincial statistical yearbooks. They represent the main groups of 
recipients of the private credits issued by the financial institutions in China. So the data-
set includes the three sub-groups of private credits to proxy private credits and therefore 
provides some suggestive insights on the role of private credits in the link between FDI and 
growth. Second, the analysis is carried out within the framework of an augmented Solow 
growth model. This is a widely-used framework and has demonstrated strong explana-
tory power of growth patterns across countries (Mankiw et al. 1992; Caselli et al. 1996; 
Benhabib and Spiegel 2000). Furthermore it is more relevant in a single-country case like 
this since an identical aggregate production is a more realistic assumption for provinces in 
a country than for countries in the world. Third, Blundell–Bond system GMM estimators 
are employed to estimate the dynamic panel model. Facilitated by the techniques devel-
oped by Roodman (2006 and 2008), system GMM estimation provides the most updated 
econometric methodology capable of generating consistent estimators in the presence 
of endogeneity and omitted variables, which are common problems associated with the 
growth model that is estimated in this study. 
  The key finding of the study is that financial development plays an important role 
in actualizing FDI benefits in China. Poor financial intermediation is found to have off-
set FDI benefits. When this financial market detrimental influence is taken into account, 
the FDI impacts on growth turn significantly positive. The second set of results provide 
preliminary evidence that helps distinguish productive credits — an indicator of good 
financial intermediation — from unproductive credits — an indicator of poor financial 
intermediation. Credits to small private enterprises make up the most productive credit 
category. They promote growth as well as magnify FDI benefits. Credits to SOEs constitute 
the unproductive credit group because they constrain growth and at the same time offset 
potential FDI benefits in China.  
  The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the theoretical model 
proposed by Alfaro et al. (2003), followed by a review of the financial system in China 
highlighting its major problem of credit misallocation in Section 3. Section 4 explains the 
empirical framework of this study, which is an augmented Solow growth model, estimated 
by system GMM estimation methodology. Section 5 presents the results and discusses 
their implications. The final section concludes with recommendations on FDI policies and 
priorities for financial reform in China.
2 Theoretical framework
The Alfaro et al. model provides a theoretical framework for understanding the interactive 
relationship between local financial markets and FDI benefits. It proposes the key hypotheses 4
Asia Pacific Economic Papers
for the empirical examination in this paper. This section presents the main assumptions 
and intuition of the model. A detailed review is included in the appendix. 
  The model assumes a small open economy consisting of two sectors — the foreign 
production sector and the domestic production sector. A continuum of agents indexed 
by their levels of ability can either work for the foreign company or become entrepreneurs 
and undertake entrepreneur activities which are subject to a fixed cost. Efficient financial 
markets are characterised by ease of access to credit by capable entrepreneurs. Such a 
system allows more entrepreneurs to take advantage of benefits from FDI and magnifies 
the effects of FDI. In contrast, an inefficient financial system fails in serving the financial 
needs of potential entrepreneurs. As a result, entrepreneurship is badly nurtured and fewer 
entrepreneurs can survive to benefit from FDI.  FDI effects are diminished. 
  The Alfaro et al. model provides a good framework for understanding the impact 
of financial markets on FDI benefits. Cross-country analysis has shown support for its 
prediction on a sample of 71 countries excluding transition economies (Alfaro et al. 2004). 
3 However, the current study intends to apply the model to a transition economy. Some 
modifications become essential due to special characteristics associated with these transi-
tional financial systems. Two important modifications are required in the Chinese context. 
The first modification is related to the indicator of financial market efficiency. The Alfaro 
model adopts the traditional indicator — interest rate differentials, so a lower interest rate 
difference indicates a higher efficiency level and vice versa. However, data of interest rate 
differentials are not available at the provincial level. More importantly, as interest rates are 
partially controlled in China and allowed to fluctuate within a band set by the authorities, 
the interest rate differential is not as indicative a measure of financial market efficiency in 
China as it is in free market economies. Rather, actual loans extended are a more direct 
measure of the scale of financial intermediation and therefore used in this study.
  Second, loans to different types of domestic enterprises are expected to have dif-
ferent implications for FDI benefits in China. Private enterprises are the dynamic part 
of the economy. They are motivated by market incentives and often quick to learn new 
technologies to compete for survival (Garnaut et al. 2001). Hence, private enterprises are 
expected to behave in consistent with the assumption of the model, so more credits to the 
private enterprises is an indication of good financial intermediation. However, state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) as a whole constitute a relative unproductive part of the economy. In 
many studies such as Guariglia and Poncet (2007), credits to SOEs are considered as an 
indicator of poor financial intermediation in China. The next section provides a detailed 
account of why this is the case in China. No. 383, 2009
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3 Financial intermediation in China 
The theoretical model highlights the important role of good financial intermediation in 
absorbing FDI benefits in a host economy. However, China’s financial system overall offers 
an example of what constitutes poor financial intermediation. This section examines what 
form poor financial intermediation takes in China, why it exists, and how it has harmed 
the well-being of the real economy, including the benefits of FDI. 
  Undoubtedly, China’s financial system has been growing rapidly after China opened 
up its economy in the late 1970s. Financial indicators show a high level of financial depth. 
China’s financial stock (including equity, corporate debt, government debt, and bank de-
posits) grew from 117 per cent of GDP in 1994 to 221 per cent of GDP at the year end 
2004, far exceeding those of other countries at similar levels of income per capita such as 
India and Indonesia (MGI 2006).
  Despite rapid growth, China’s financial system continues to bear the problem of 
credit misallocation, which is a direct result of poor financial intermediation. A further 
consequence of it is that the bulk of financial resources are directed to unproductive state-
owned enterprises (Table 1) while better private enterprises deprived of external funding. 
As a result, the private credit ratio is unusually low. 4 In 1999, it ranked China 63rd in the 
lowest quartile of a sample of 78 countries in the world (Boyreau-Bebray 2003). In that 
year, the private sector accounted for only one per cent of bank lending (IFC 1999). Over 
the past decade, credits to private companies have grown, but the speed has been rather 
modest.
Table 1 Performance of top 500 Chinese enterprises in 2007, by ownership (per 
cent)
Ownership  Share of assets in total  Share of profits in total  Return on assets
State  93.6  87.9  1.4 
Collective  4.2  2.2  0.8 
Private  1.7  7.1  6.1 
Foreign  0.5  2.8  8.5
Source: A report on the Development of China’s Enterprises 2007, Enterprise Management 
Publishing House, Beijing, Chapter 12, p.88.
 
  Private credits are constrained because state owned enterprises receive most of the 
funding from the financial system (Figure 1). In 2003, wholly state-owned enterprises 
absorbed 35 per cent of nonagricultural commercial bank loans. Enterprises with partial 
state ownership accounted for another 38 percent of outstanding credits. In total, despite 
producing less than half of the GDP, the state economy took up 73 per cent of credits. In 6
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contrast, the most productive private portion of the economy (including foreign firms) 
produced 52 per cent of GDP but received only 27 per cent of bank loans outstanding 
(MGI 2006). The statistics in Figure 1 show a skewed distribution of bank loans favouring 
the idle part of the economy, begging the question of how these lending decisions were 
made.
  It appears that firm performance or project profitability is not a major concern for 
credit officers in China though it should be for loans to be productive. Other factors help 
them make decisions to lend to unprofitable state-owned enterprises. One major factor is 
government intervention, which is influential because financial intermediation in China 
is mostly bank-based  and the commercial banking sector is dominated by state owned 
commercial banks under state control. The four biggest state-owned commercial banks 
together account for two-thirds of financial system assets.












Corporate loans outstanding GDP
Notes: 
1.  State-owned  enterprises  or  SOEs  include  wholly  state-owned  and  shareholding 
enterprises. Most of the shareholding enterprises are partly state owned. Some are 
state controlled, some are not; Collective enterprises are owned by the population. 
Many run like private enterprises, but some are effectively controlled by local 
political interests; Private enterprises include local privately owned enterprises, 
foreign joint ventures, and wholly owned foreign enterprises.
2. Breakdown of industrial value-added by ownership type, 2003, as determined by the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
3. Total corporate and government bank lending are based on a survey on commercial 
bank new loans conducted in 2002 by the People’s Bank of China, which is the 
most recent publicly available data on lending by company type. 
Source: OECD; PBOC; McKinsey Global Institute analysis (MGI 2006)7
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  Scholars observe two types of government intervention existing — ‘ex ante inter-
vention’ and ‘ex post intervention’ (Lu et al. 2005). Before the lending decision is made, 
government intervention takes the form of ‘policy lending’.6 For example, the central 
government sometimes encourages banks to extend credit beyond the prudential level 
to achieve a targeted growth rate. Local governments press banks to lend to loss-making 
SOEs in order to avoid rising unemployment.  In this way, political concerns outweigh 
economic fundamentals, which lead to many decisions of misallocation of the funds. Ex 
post intervention occurs after the lending decision is made. The government intervenes in 
the credit markets by bailing out troubled SOEs. Acknowledging the implicit government 
guarantee, state-owned banks are willing to lend to state-owned enterprises because loans 
to SOEs seem to be ‘safer’ (MGI 2006). 
  Without government protection, private enterprises are discriminated against in 
accessing bank credit. Before the end of the 1990s, this discrimination was legitimate 
because the private sector was not acknowledged as an integral part of the economy. After 
the system was liberalised, discrimination took a different form. Two surveys undertaken 
by the People’s Bank of China (ACFB 2003) show banks in China are more likely to dis-
criminate the borrowers by size rather than ownership, probably due to the fact that loan 
decisions are on the basis of collateral (Cheng and Degryse 2006). The average size of 
private enterprises is unusually small compared to state-owned enterprises (Huang 2003). 
This is mainly due to the fact that they lack the financial support to grow in the first place. 
However, because of the small size, they are again denied formal financial resources from 
the banking system and have to rely primarily on internal sources such as family savings, 
retained earnings and sometime even underground ‘banks’ for start-up capital and subse-
quent investment, which are an expensive and inefficient way of financing (IFC 2000). 
  That banks lend little to private enterprises and small firms also reflects institutional 
deficiencies. The MGI (2006) report reveals that most Chinese banks, including both 
large state-owned banks and small city and rural cooperatives, often lack the skills and 
tools to assess their credit and price loans. Moreover, hampered by the unreliability of 
financial reports of private companies and the insufficient legal enforcement of contracts, 
banks generally consider private lending ‘too risky’ and thus hesitate to extend loans to 
the private sector.  
  Misallocation of credits inflicts significant costs on many parts of the Chinese economy. 
An immediate cost is on the banking sector itself. Financial resources mobilised to the inef-
ficient SOE sector over years have accumulated a large number of non-performing loans 
(NPL) for banks, which is a good indicator of the size of the cost of credit misallocation. 
By 2001, 31 per cent of loan balances of large commercial banks were categorised as NPLs. 8
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The number was reduced to 10 per cent in 2005, but can be almost entirely explained by 
the government’s recapitalisation program through transferring the NPLs to state asset 
management companies (Podpiera 2006).  
  On the other hand, hefty loans to SOEs can not save poorly managed SOEs from 
failing. Rather they contribute to the soft-budget problem of SOEs and actually delay 
SOE reforms from taking effect. The overall productivity of the economy is lowered by 
allocating a disproportionate share of credit to the unproductive state sector. 
  Another important but often ignored category of cost is the opportunity costs of 
the misallocation of capital. If given easy access to the credit market and adequate financial 
support, the productive private sector could have generated more output. This could be 
realised by more private entrepreneurs starting up their businesses and more small private 
firms developing into larger competitive firms employing economies of scale. 
  A further implication is that FDI benefits would have been larger and more explicit 
if more loans were extended to the productive private sector. As the theoretical model 
shows, FDI benefits in a host country rely on a financial system that supports the develop-
ment of local enterprises to absorb the benefits. However, it is clear from the review that 
financial intermediaries in China favour the SOE sector over the private sector and allow 
a disproportionate share of capital to flow into unproductive SOEs. Because of the almost 
unconditional support that SOEs receive from the state-owned banks, they have little motive 
to learn lessons from FDI that would help them to increase productivity and compete with 
the dynamic private sector. Rather, they are inclined to increase the production scale and 
employment to satisfy the government’s concerns. However, the private sector is willing 
to learn and potentially able to absorb the benefits but deprived of the opportunity. This 
credit misallocation imposes a large cost to the economy and may explain the paradox of 
large FDI inflow but little FDI benefits in China, a proposition that the study intends to 
test in the following section. 
4 Empirical Framework 
This section constructs an empirical framework to examine the effects of financial sector 
development on FDI benefits in China. The two components of the framework are: an 
empirical model specification based on Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992), and a dynamic 
panel model estimated by the system GMM estimation method.
Model Specification
As the central prediction of the theoretical model is that improvements in financial inter-
mediation increase output by increasing the marginal product of FDI (Appendix), Alfaro 9
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et al. (2003) suggest that it is more relevant to observe the transitional growth effect in 
applying their model to data. This paper adopts Mankiw et al.’s (1992) model specifica-
tion to capture the effects of financial markets on FDI benefits in terms of growth. This 
specification has been extensively tested in many growth studies and shows excellent de-
scription of cross-country data (Caselli et al. 1996; Benhabib and Spiegel 2000) as well as 
cross-province data in China (Hao 2006; Guariglia and Poncet 2007). 
  For a panel data-set across Chinese provinces, the baseline model takes the form: 
, , 1 , 1 , 1 , ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) '
i t i t i t i t i t i t y y y W β δ η ξ ε
− − − − = + + + +               (1)
  ( N i ,..., 1 =  and  T t ,..., 2 =  )
The growth of income per capita in province  i ,  ) ln( ) ln( 1 , , − − t i t i y y , is a function of the 
province’s initial level of income  ) ln( 1 , − t i y  and the determinants of its steady-state  1 , − t i W . 
Fixed effects across provinces and time are taken into account and denoted by  i η  and   t ξ    
respectively.  t i, ε  is the i.i.d. idiosyncratic error term.
  Steady-state determinants  1 , − t i W  include three groups of variables and values of the 
initial period are used as proxies.8  The first group is a group of variables used in the aug-
mented Solow model, including population growth, saving rate and human capital. They 
are measured by the growth rate of working-age population, the share of investment in 
GDP including private investment and government investment, and the share of population 
holding tertiary-level qualifications respectively. Government investment or expenditure 
is also considered as an indicator of government size.  The second group contains two 
policy variables, identified in the literature as important correlates of growth in the Chinese 
context.9 They are share of state entities in total investment as an indicator of the size of 
the state sector and trade volume to capture the degree of economic openness. 
  The model is extended by adding key variables of the analysis: FDI and local fi-
nancial market indicators and their interactions. FDI is measured by total FDI inflows. 
Financial indicators include total loans and total deposits and three categories of private 
credits, including credits to individual enterprises, to township and village enterprises, and 
to foreign-owned enterprises. 
  A key issue relating to the model specification is whether and how to take ratios for 
the variables in level terms such as trade, FDI and financial market indicators. Traditionally, if 
the dependent variable is in ratios and so are most of the explanatory variables, it is optimal 
to transform the explanatory variables in levels into ratios to keep consistency (Firebaugh 
and Gibbs 1985). Otherwise, standard errors would rise and coefficients of these variables 
would become inefficient. Moreover, GDP ratios are often taken for endogenous variables 
such as trade and FDI as a standard way to neutralize the effect of economy size. These 10
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are valid because coefficients associated with these variables remain unchanged when the 
variables are in logarithmic form.
  However, two problems arise on taking GDP ratios when the interaction terms are 
included in the model as in this study. First, the coefficients of the ratios are no longer the 
same as those of the levels for variables involved in the interaction terms and the interaction 
terms themselves. Some simple algebra illustrates this.10 Second, if interpreting the vari-
ables in the GDP ratios as they are, their meanings and the implications of the coefficients 
diverge from those implied in the theoretical model. For example, the FDI/GDP ratio 
is more of a measurement of FDI intensity. Thus the effect of FDI/GDP ratio on GDP 
per capita is different from the impact of FDI inflows on GDP, though the latter is more 
relevant to the theoretical model.
  The study adopts per capita ratios as a remedy to tackle these two issues. First, per 
capita ratios are consistent with the dependent variable which is GDP per capita. Second, 
as a result of the consistency, these variables share the same interpretation as their level 
counterparts. Concerns about endogeneity will be formally addressed by the GMM meth-
odology. All the monetary values are normalised to constant prices (2000) by provincial 
GDP deflators before taking per capita ratios. In some cases, such as trade and FDI inflow 
values, which are in US dollars, are first converted to local prices before normalisation.11 
  The analysis is undertaken in two steps. First a baseline regression is employed to 
examine the individual effects of FDI and the financial system on growth, 
, , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , ln( ) (1 )ln( ) ' ln ln
i t i t i t i t i t i t i t y y W fdi fin β δ λ γ η ξ ε
− − − − = + + + + + + + ,   (2)
Then, in an elaborate regression, FDI finance interaction term is added to assess the role 
of local financial sector development on FDI’s impact on growth,
, , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 ln( ) (1 )ln( ) ' ln ln
i t i t i t i t i t y y W fdi fin β δ λ γ
− − − − = + + + +    
         , 1 , 1 , (ln ln )
i t i t i t i t fdi fin φ η ξ ε
− − + × + + +    
,                   (3)
A positive φ
~
 suggests that an improvement in financial efficiency leads to greater FDI 
effects on growth, whereas a negative φ
~
 indicates an increase in financial inefficiency 
reduces FDI benefits. 
GMM Estimation
The empirical model shows several notable features. First, it has a dynamic structure and 
is a dynamic panel model.  Due to the ‘dynamic panel bias’ exposed by Nickell (1981)12, 
the classic OLS estimators in equation (2) are biased in the presence of individual fixed 11
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effects and the traditional Within-Group estimators are biased in short panels.13 Second, 
many variables involved in the model, such as investment, education, and trade, are well-
known endogenous variables and are usually persistent series. Finally, the issue of omitted 
variables is common problem associated with the empirical growth model, considering the 
large number of potential factors that might influence economic growth. 
  Arellano–Bond GMM Difference estimation method (Arellano and Bond 1991) 
and Blundell–Bond GMM System estimation method (Blundell and Bond 1998)14 are 
two of the most advanced and updated methods capable of addressing the issues of en-
dogeneity issue and omitted variable and, most importantly, they confer unbiased and 
consistent estimators under these circumstances. However, Blundell and Bond (1998) find 
that Difference GMM estimators have poor finite sample properties and are subject to a 
large-downward finite-sample bias. Given a finite sample and a short panel data-set with 
persistent time-series, this study employs System GMM estimators as they show superior 
functionality in overcoming the shortcomings of Difference GMM counterparts. 
  The GMM approach, Difference GMM or System GMM, is an extension of gener-
alised-method-of-moment approach integrating instrumental variables. The basic idea is to 
take first differences to remove unobserved time-invariant individual fixed effects, and then 
instrument the right-hand-side lagged dependent variables in the first-differenced equations 
using levels of the series lagged two periods or more. This is the difference GMM. The 
system GMM approach adds equations of levels to equations of differences (in Difference 
GMM) and thus estimates a system of equations. Instruments used in the levels equations 
are lagged first-differences of the series (Bond et al. 2001). All the instruments are only 
valid with certain conditions attached and these are explained in the illustration below, 
based on (Arellano and Bond 1991; Blundell and Bond 1998; Bond et al. 2001). 
  Recall the base line model (2) but in a simpler form, 
, , 1 , 1 , (1 ) '
i t i t i t i t i t y y W β δ η ξ ε
− − = + + + + + ,  (4)
First-difference to remove the time-invariant fixed effects  i η ,
, , 1 , 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 1 , , 1 (1 )( ) ( )' ( ) ( )
i t i t i t i t i t i t t t i t i t y y y y W W β δ ξ ξ ε ε
− − − − − − − − = + − + − + − + − ,  (5)
2 , − t i y
 
and deeper lags of  t i y ,  
are qualified instruments for  ) ( 2 , 1 , − − − t i t i y y  under the condi-
tion of no second order serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term  t i, ε . This applies to 
instruments of endogenous explanatory variables. Exogenous explanatory variables employ 
standard instruments. Hence, the vectors of explanatory variables  1 , − t i w  are categorised 
into three groups — endogenous 
endo
t i w 1 , − , predetermined 
pred
t i w 1 , − , and exogenous 
exog
t i w 1 , −  
15, moment conditions applying for  ) ( 2 , 1 , − − − t i t i y y  and each group of  2 , 1 , − − − t i t i w w  in 12
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the first-difference equations are therefore, 
, , , 1 [ ( )] 0
i t s i t i t E y ε ε
− − − =  for  2 ≥ s ;  T t ,..., 3 =  
, , , 1 [ ( )] 0
endo
i t s i t i t E W ε ε
− − − =  for  2 ≥ s ;  T t ,..., 3 =  
, , , 1 [ ( )] 0
pred
i t s i t i t E W ε ε
− − − =  for  1 ≥ s ;  T t ,..., 2 =  
, , , 1 [ ( )] 0
exgo
i t i t i t E W ε ε
− − =  for  T t ,..., 1 =
  System GMM estimators employs additional moment conditions for the level equa-
tions with ‘the initial conditions’ satisfied.16 The moment condition for  1 , − t i y  is,
, , 1 , [( )( )] 0
i t s i t s i i t E y y η ε
− − − − + =  for  1 = s ;  T t ,..., 3 =
Moment conditions for endogenous, predetermined, and exogenous variables in the level 
equations are omitted here to save space. Corresponding to each period, instruments for 
the system develops into a complete matrix and system GMM estimators are derived from 
the system.17  
  A step further from the standard application GMM system estimators is that two 
techniques developed by Roodman (2006) are adopted to overcome specific data problems 
of this study. First, there are significant gaps in the data-set. First-difference transforma-
tions (equation 5) magnify these data gaps, so orthogonal deviations recommended by 
Roodmand (2006) are employed to minimise data loss.18 Furthermore, as the number of 
the cross-section (N) is small in this analysis, instruments easily outnumber N, which is a 
signal of the problem of ‘too many instruments’. The implications are that the instruments 
may have ‘overfit endogenous variables’ and weaken the specification tests. A possible way 
to control this is to ‘collapse’ the instruments to reduce the number of instruments without 
losing much information from the data (Roodman 2006 and 2008).
  Consistency of the estimators relies on validity of the instruments, which are linked 
to the above-mentioned conditions. To verify instrument validity, two specification tests 
in the computer packages are used. First, the M2 test tests second-order correlation of the 
error term. Second, the Sargan test examines for over-identifying restrictions or, in other 
words, the validity of the instruments. 
Data
A cross-province panel data-set is employed in this study. This consists of annual data of 13
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all 31 provinces in China including four provincial level municipalities (currently Beijing, 
Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing). Data are collected for the period 1999–2006. It is a 
balanced panel yet it contains gaps especially in the data series of private credits. As shown 
in the summary statistics (Table 2), the shortest series of credits to foreign enterprises 
reduces the total number of observations by more than one third.
  Nevertheless, this study makes the best use of the latest data available across prov-
inces. More importantly, it is the first study of the credit situation among sub-groups of 
private enterprises to examine their individual relationship with FDI benefits. Several own-
ership types exist in China under the cap of private enterprises, including individual and 
private enterprises (PRVs), township and village enterprises (TVEs), and enterprises with 
foreign capital (FORs). Compared to state-owned enterprises, the three types all deliver 
higher returns to investment and achieve higher productivity, which is solid evidence of 
their non-state ownership superiority (MGI 2006). However, in terms of their financing 
situations, they show significant heterogeneity. Despite the lending bias against non-state 
firms, Huang (2003) reveals that within the non-state category TVEs are substantially 
favoured over PRVs by Chinese banks. This may be partly due to the fact that many TVEs 
are effectively controlled by local governments that have strong influence over lending 
decisions of local bank branches (MGI 2006). At the same time, the financial situation of 
foreign firms (FORs) is different from others because they have direct and easier access to 
foreign capital from overseas. But like TVEs, they are also in a better position than private 
individual firms whose financing options are extremely constrained, sometimes to the only 
option of costly informal financing for survival (IFC 2000).19  Overall, divergences among 
credit lines and credit accessibility for each sub-group are large and significant. Hence, it 
is essential to distinguish them from each other for any useful policy implications to be 
gained.
  The main data source for the sub-groups of private credits is individual provincial 
statistical yearbooks. All three sub-group data series are under the short-term loan category 
of all financial institutions operating in each province.20 As stock markets are not well de-
veloped in China, firms rely on debt, especially short-term debt, for financing investment. 
Short-term loan portfolios of financial institutions thus reveal how financial resources are 
allocated and how firms of different ownership are financed. FDI inflows are measured by 
‘actually utilised amount of direct foreign investment’, in contrast to the contract amount. 
Until 2003, data of the former were available in the China Statistical Yearbook (CSY). 
Since 2004, CSY only reports the contract amount. As a result, post-2003 FDI data are 
sourced in publications of the Ministry of Commerce to keep data consistency. Aggregate 
financial data are mainly from the Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking and other 
data for variables of the growth equation are mainly from CSY. A detailed description of 14
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data definitions and sources is included in Table 1.
5 Results 
Within-group, Difference GMM, and System GMM estimators are reported for compari-
son with the final results using System GMM – Roodman extension estimators (Table 4). 
For system GMM estimators and Roodman extension estimators, one-step estimators are 
reported in association with different financial indicators respectively.20 Table 4 records 
results related to total credits. Table 5 and Table 6 reports results associated with sub-
groups of private credits in comparison with total credits and non-private credits. For all 
groups, the baseline models are first tested to see the individual correlation of FDI and 
financial market development with growth. Then the expanded models or test models 
with the interaction terms are examined to reveal how local financial intermediation may 
affect FDI benefits in China.  
  Within-group estimators and Different GMM estimators in Table 4 show results of 
similar pattern, in terms of coefficient signs and significance levels. As discussed in Section 
4, the within-groups estimation provides biased estimator of initial level of income (l.y) 
(Models 1 and 2), whereas Difference GMM estimators are biased downward as a result 
of a small sample (Models 3 and 4). System GMM estimators overcome the small sample 
bias associated with difference GMM estimators. However, System GMM estimators 
create a new problem — ‘too many instruments’ that could ‘overfit endogenous vari-
ables’. Instruments increase from 134 to 176 for the baseline models (Models 3 and 5) 
and from 141 to 189 for the test models (Models 4 and 6). Roodman’s techniques help 
to significantly reduce the number of instruments by two thirds (Models 7 and 8). As a 
result, the significance level of endogenous variables such as education and population all 
drop considerably. Nevertheless, the Roodman extension of System GMM provides the 
most consistent and unbiased estimators among the available estimation methods.               
  The first observation from the results is that the augmented Solow-growth model 
is appropriate for describing provincial growth pattern in China. Initial income has strong 
explanatory power for economic growth in all equations. However, a positive coefficient 
shows a picture of growth divergence (Models 7 and 8), instead of convergence that is 
observed in cross-country studies. The past decade has seen income inequalities rising 
rapidly across regions in China. Many recent studies confirm that economic reforms 
have widened the income gap between different provinces at least in the short term (Luo 
and Zhu 2008). In addition to initial income, education also display positive and highly 
significant coefficient, highlighting the important factors contributing to local growth in 
China. Nevertheless, due to data limitations, this is a short-term trend observed from the 15
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period 1999–2006.
  FDI and financial indicators are key variables in this study. FDI per se has no sta-
tistically significant effects on growth and in the baseline model (Model 7 in Table 4) 
its coefficients even show puzzling negative signs. Other studies have reported similar 
insignificant results (Luo 2007), which are in contrast to what the traditional FDI growth 
theory would predict — a strong positive correlation between FDI and economic growth 
(King and Levine 1993).  However, in our study this result is not surprising as poor 
growth response to FDI is one of the reasons that have motivated this study to reveal the 
mechanism of FDI benefits working in China. 
  Another motivation comes from evidence of perverse local financial market develop-
ment, so it is not surprising to see that total credits enter the equation statistically signifi-
cantly, with negative signs (Model 7 in Table 4). The results indicate that a larger financial 
sector is often associated with less growth cross Chinese provinces. In other words, financial 
resources fail in helping the local economy to grow as in many other places (Levine et al. 
2000). Worse, loans tend to restrain growth in China. This empirical evidence resembles 
the results of other studies including that of Guariglia and Poncet (2007). As explained in 
those studies, financial institutions in China misallocate financial resources. They channel 
the disproportionately large amount of credit to support unproductive segments of the 
economy, leaving the most dynamic part of the economy in credit constraint. As a result, 
the more credits are expanded, the more they are used to support ailing SOEs resulting 
in further economic loss and overcapacity.21 The notorious feature of credit misallocation 
prevalent in Chinese financial institutions explains the negative finance–growth nexus in 
China. Total deposits show a similar pattern because savings are used to finance loans to 
unproductive SOEs. These entail similar harmful impacts on growth as loans do. 
  The main task of this study is to examine how financial sector development influ-
ences the effects of FDI on growth and this is examined by means of interaction terms. 
First, as shown in regression (Model 8 in Table 4), the interaction term of FDI with total 
credits enters in the regression highly significantly, at the one per cent level, and its coef-
ficient shows a negative sign, which suggests the significant influence of financial markets 
on FDI’s effects on growth and the influence is detrimental. Perhaps more importantly, 
the coefficient associated with FDI changes significantly positive at a 10 per cent level, after 
the interaction term is added. The results reveal the counterfactual scenario that once the 
negative impact of financial markets on FDI–growth linkage is separated out, the original 
FDI–growth relationship is positive. 
  To interpret this in a different way, the result (Model 8 in Table 4) helps to explain 
why the coefficients of FDI in the baseline models (Model 7 in Table 4) are negative. It 
is because financial market conditions overthrow FDI’s otherwise positive effects. The 16
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correlation between FDI and growth is 0.0177 (Model 8 in Table 4), and the correla-
tion between the FDI–loan interaction term and growth is -0.0207. Thus, including the 
negative effects of loans on FDI growth correlation, the observed FDI effects on growth 
in total is -0.0030.  
  The next question is whether all credits have the same harmful effects on the 
FDI– growth relationship as total credits reveals. Data on credits to SOEs are non-existing 
on the provincial level, so are the data on private credits. To distinguish possibly different 
effects associated with different type of borrowers, sub-groups of private credits are included 
in regressions (Table 5 and Table 6). However, the data sets are small by size and further 
limited by data gaps, so each sub-group of private credits is examined separately because 
each has a different sample due to data availability. Also, due to the different samples and 
data availability, disaggregation of total credits into non-private credits and private credits 
reduces the size of the whole sample significantly, by two third, and therefore limits the 
power of estimation. 
  Non-private credits are derived from total credits minus the sum of all sub-groups 
of private credits. Comparing the results in Table 5 suggests that non-private credit nega-
tively influence growth whereas credits to private and individual enterprises (CP) positively 
contribute growth, as expected. However, the regressions fail to capture other significant 
relationships mainly due to the small sample size.  
  An alternative method to overcome the small size problem is to use total credits to 
proxy SOE credits for comparison.22 Based on the national aggregate data that loans to 
SOEs dominate loan portfolios of financial institutions and loans, total credits are assumed 
to capture the pattern of credits to SOEs in each province. One drawback as a consequence 
is the concern of multicollinearity between total credits and private credits since the former 
contains the latter. Nevertheless, values of private credits are extremely small compared to 
those of total credits (Table 2), so multicollinearity is expected to be not a serious issue. 
  An important result from this set of regressions is that private credits show different 
effects among sub-groups (Table 6). First, the variable of credits to private and individual 
enterprises (CP), also characterised as small private enterprises, displays a significantly posi-
tive coefficient at the five per cent level (Model 12 in Table 6). The result confirms the 
productiveness of small private enterprises, suggesting more credits to this group would 
promote growth. More importantly, CP’s interaction with FDI is significant and positive 
at a high significance level. That is to say, the combined effects of FDI and credits to small 
private enterprises on growth are positive. There could be two interpretations for this re-
sult: one being the marginal product of CP increases with more FDI; and the other being 
the marginal product of FDI increases with more credits to these enterprises. The first 
interpretation suggests that small private enterprises learn and benefit from FDI presence 17
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so that they produce more return on loans. The second interpretation is that the marginal 
product of FDI increases as a result of more local business supported by the credit line 
absorbing the FDI benefits. So FDI generates more output through its positive spill-overs 
to lift the output of local businesses. The two interpretations are essentially one, reflecting 
the complementary nature of FDI and productive local enterprises in their relationship 
with output growth. 
  The second group of private credits examined is credits to township and village 
enterprises (CT). CT per se has a significant and positive effect on growth (Model 13 in 
Table 6). Like credits to small private enterprises, marginal products of credits to town-
ship and villages are positive. It is a productive force of growth. However, the interaction 
term with FDI in the regression has lost explanatory power. In other words, the mutually 
reinforcing mechanism with FDI observed in small private enterprises seems not to be 
working for township and village enterprises. This may be due to their implicitly close re-
lationship with the government. For a further comparison, the third category of domestic 
credits to foreign-funded enterprises has neither significant impact on growth directly nor 
any effects through interaction with foreign capital (Model 14 in Table 6).
  Total credits are included in all regressions associated with private credits to proxy 
SOE credits. They have negative coefficients in all regressions and the coefficients are 
significant. Provided that credits to SOEs constitute the major part of total credits and 
credits to private enterprises are either insignificantly positive or insignificant, the significant 
and negative coefficients associated with total credits indicate the strong counter-growth 
effects of SOE credits. Moreover, the coefficients of this interaction with FDI are nega-
tive and highly significant, indicating that SOE credits have a detrimental effect on FDI 
benefits as well. As shown in the interpretation of CP’s interaction, the mechanism also 
works from both sides, though in an opposite way. Marginal products of SOE credits 
decline with more FDI coming because most SOEs are unproductive in China. They are 
historically protected by the state and therefore least motivated to learn from FDI. With 
greater FDI flows increasing competitive pressure in the country, SOEs often fail in the 
competition with foreign firms and produce less and less output.  As a consequence, SOEs 
unproductiveness offsets the marginal product of FDI or the FDI benefits. 
  In sum, the results support the Alfaro et al. model on the role of local financial 
development in FDI benefits. But to best explain the complexity of the situation in China, 
a distinction between good and bad financial intermediation is needed. Credits to small 
private enterprises are a measure of good financial intermediation in China. Expanded credits 
to this group indicate a more efficient financial system because the system intermediates 
financial resources to the most productive section of the economy, which also has the most 
capacity to absorb FDI benefits. So such a system magnifies FDI benefits. By contrast, 18
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credits to SOEs provide an indicator of poor financial intermediation in China because they 
allow resources to be channeled to the most unproductive part of the economy, which has 
the least capability as well as the least incentive to learn from FDI. Hence FDI benefits are 
severely diminished. Hence, the China case provides support to the model in both ways. 
Good financial intermediation strengthens the FDI–growth linkage, while poor financial 
intermediation offsets the FDI–growth benefits. 
  The specification tests include M2 tests (the second order auto-correlation test) and 
Hansen tests. Their results are reported for each regression in the result table. The M2 test 
fails to reject the absence of second-order serial correlations in all regressions. The Hansen 
test also fails to reject the null hypothesis of the validity of over-identifying restrictions. 
Both test results suggest that the instruments used are valid. In addition, though the test 
results are not included in the table, all the regressions pass a set of Difference-in-Hansen 
tests for testing the exogeneity of instrument subsets. As a whole, use of the system GMM 
is justified.
  Finally, two strategies are adopted to test the robustness and sensitivity of the results. 
First, in an attempt to smooth over short-term business cycle turbulence, two-year averages 
are used to approximate steady-state values. This is only applicable for regressions involv-
ing total credits and total deposits, not for sub-groups of private credits as the averaging 
reduces samples to unusable. However, for applicable cases, similar results are obtained to 
those from the annual data. The second strategy is to test a sub-sample of data, excluding 
three municipality outliers (Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai). Again, the main results still 
hold. 
6 Conclusion
The study explores the reason why FDI appears to have had limited impact on economic 
growth in China. It applies the Alfaro et al. model to investigate whether financial sector 
development plays a role in this weak FDI–growth linkage. A dynamic panel data model 
is estimated by Blundell-Bond system GMM estimators over a cross-province data-set for 
the period 1999–2006. The key result from the study is that financial development indeed 
plays a role in FDI–growth linkage in China. Poor financial intermediation substantially 
offsets FDI’s potential benefits on local economic growth. This explains why a large amount 
of FDI inflows has not been accompanied by strong positive growth effects in China as 
found in many other countries. 
  Two policy implications can be drawn from the empirical findings. First, the direct 
policy implication is that to ensure positive benefits from FDI in China, domestic financial 
reforms are crucial. This is an important perspective for making FDI policies. In addi-19
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tion to fiscal and financial incentives to attract more FDI in the early years of economic 
reform, the capacity building literature has recently offered many suggestions on how to 
effectively utilise FDI, such as improving technical training, building linkages between local 
and foreign firms, and increasing labor mobility (Fan and Hu 2007; Ran et al. 2007). On 
top of capacity building programs, this study highlights a stronger role for local financial 
development in realising FDI benefits in China, because the financial system is basic and 
fundamental for a dynamic private sector to exist, grow, and then be able to learn from 
FDI.
  The results also reveal some key priorities of financial reforms. More credits to small 
private enterprises are an indication of good financial intermediation, while more loans 
extended to unproductive SOEs signal poor financial intermediation. The priority of reform 
comes down to tackling the difficult problem of credit misallocation. Loan distribution in 
China is not commercially based and far from efficient. It calls for fundamental changes in 
financial institutions’ lending behaviour, which is a multi-dimensional complicated policy 
challenge. The study is not designed to shed light on this issue, but a review of the financial 
system in China suggests that state intervention/protection still exists in most Chinese 
banks as well as in state enterprises. This prevents banks from making commercially viable 
decisions and delays the fundamental reforms in SOEs. Maybe the challenge remains to 
liberalise the economy and remove state intervention from micromanagement.   
  Finally, the study is constrained by data availability especially for private credit 
data across provinces. Also, there is a lack of advanced econometric technology to totally 
overcome the ‘too many instruments’ problem associated with the data, though some 
techniques have been employed to address the issue. Both problems are expected to be 
solved in future research. Moreover, from the theoretical point of view, future efforts could 
be directed to incorporating the SOE sector in the Alfaro et al. model. 20
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Appendix
This appendix reviews the Alfaro et al. (2003) model. It demonstrates how the financial 
system influences the number of local entrepreneurs that can absorb FDI spill-overs, which 
decides the actual FDI benefits to be materialised locally. The model assumes a small, 
open economy consisting of two sectors: the foreign production sector and the domestic 
production sector.
Foreign production sector
The foreign production sector follows a standard constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas 
production function. It uses domestically supplied labour and foreign capital, 
1 ( )
FDI FDI
t t t Y AL K
β β − =     (A-1)
from which the international rate of interest,  and the wage rate,  in the foreign sector 
can be derived, 
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Domestic production sector
The domestic product is modeled as a sum of individual domestic entrepreneurs’ output. 
First, the economy is assumed to be populated by a continuum of agents of total mass 1, 
indexed by their level of ability 
i
t ε , following a standard uniform distribution,  ) 1 , 0 ( ∈
i
t ε  
(Figure 1). Then, there exists a threshold level of ability 
*
t ε , above which agents become 
entrepreneurs and undertake entrepreneurial activities in the domestic production sector. 
Subject to a fixed investment S , each entrepreneur produces output 
i
t Y  benefiting from 
the presence of FDI 
FDI
t K . 
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The threshold level of ability divides agents into two groups. The first group consists of 
agents having above-threshold ability and subsequently become entrepreneurs working 
in the domestic production sector with a total amount equal to 
*
t ε . The second group 
has agents of below-threshold ability. They then join the labour force of the foreign sec-
tor equal  ) 1 (
*
t ε − . 
Figure 1 The cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the standard uniform 
distribution of the ability level 
i
t ε
  The assumption of agents’ ability level following a standard uniform distribution 
simplifies the algebra without loosing generality of the model. As shown in Figure 1, the 
probability for an agent to take on an ability level equal or below the threshold level abil-
ity is 
*
t ε , so the percentage of the agents who work in the foreign sector is 
*
t ε , which is 
also the total amount of labor employed in the foreign production sector since the total 
population of agents is normalised to 1. Likewise, the probability for an agent to have an 
above- threshold level of ability is  ) 1 (
*
t ε − , so the amount of agents who become entre-
preneurs and engage domestic production is  ) 1 (
*
t ε − .
Household and occupational choice
The threshold level of ability is decided by the agents’ occupational choice based on the 22
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income streams associated with each choice. Agents who choose to work for a foreign 
company earn an income stream equal to their wages w plus the return on their level of 
assets  1 − t b  at the beginning of the period,  1 ) 1 ( − + + t b r w . Those who choose to produce 
in the domestic sector must pay off their loans at the end of the period and therefore earn 
a net income of 
1 (1 )( )
i
t t Y i s b
− − + − . An agent is indifferent between working for the 
foreign firm and starting its own business if the incomes earned are the same, 
1 1 (1 ) (1 )( )
i
t t t w r b Y i s b
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The role of the financial market efficiency appears in the model due to its role in determin-
ing the threshold ability level and therefore the number of entrepreneurs that can benefit 
from FDI spillovers. Financial inefficiency is measured as δ , the difference between the 
lending rate r  and the borrowing rate i . A bigger δ  indicates higher financial costs which 
characterizes an inefficient financial system. From this equation,  0 /
* > ∂ ∂ δ εt  , which 
suggests a higher level of financial efficiency increases the number of entrepreneurs.  
Comparative statistics
Comparative statistics reveal how FDI’s output effects hinge on local financial market 
conditions. First, the total output of the economy is:
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So the total effect of FDI on output is:
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An improvement in the financial sector increases the number of domestic entrepreneurs 
and therefore increases the marginal product of FDI. In other words, an efficient financial 
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Statistical tables
Table 2 Variable definitions and sources
Variables  Description  Source
Dependent Variable  Real GDP (1999 constant price) /  China Statistical Yearbook 
GDP per capita (y)  working age population  (CSY), various years 
       
Explanatory Variables       
1. FDI Variables     
FDI per capita  (fdi)  *Real FDI inflows (‘actually used  CSY (1999–2003); The 
  amount of direct foreign investment’)  Ministry of Commerce, 
  / working age population  PRC (2004–2006) 
2. Financial Indicators     
Total loans per capita   Real total loans  / working age  Almanac of China’s 
(loan)  population  Finance and Banking 
     (ACFB), various years 
Total deposits per   Real total deposits / working age  ACFB, various years 
capita (depo)  population 
Township credits per   Real credits to the township  Statistical yearbook of 
capita (ct)   enterprises /  working age  individual provinces, 
  population  various years 
Private credit per   Real credits to the private and  Statistical yearbook of 
capita (cp)  individual enterprises / working age  individual provinces, 
  population  various years 
Foreign credits per   Real credits to foreign enterprises /  Statistical yearbook of 
capita (cf)  working age population  individual provinces, 
    various years 
3. Growth Determinants    
Investment GDP ratio   Ratio of investment in fixed assets  CSY, various years 
(inv)  to nominal GDP    
Human capital (edu)  Ratio of population with educational   China Population 
  attainment of college and any higher   Statistics Yearbook 
  level in the total population age ≥  6   (CPSY) and CSY, 
    various years 
Population growth   Growth rate of working age  CSY, various years 
(pop)  population 
Government exp.  Ratio of government expenditure to  CSY, various years 
GDP ratio (gov)  nominal GDP 
Trade volume per   Real value of exports and imports /  CSY, various years  
capita (trade)  working age population
*: all the nominal terms are transformed into real terms using GDP deflators. 26
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Table 3 Summary statistics 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
GDP per capita  248  2.368878  1.813497  0.461488  11.849220 
           
Inv./GDP  248  0.420191  0.114749  0.241852  0.794273 
Labour growth  248  1.015750  0.026392  0.953728  1.269022 
Edu.  248  0.056833  0.042562  0.000900  0.293600 
Gov./GDP  248  0.166440  0.110811  0.046791  0.827598 
SOE  248  0.466765  0.142286  0.155600  0.958900 
Trade per capita  248  1.356358  2.923473  0.022900  20.732300 
           
FDI per capita  248  0.073058  0.120426  0.000000  0.628700 
           
Loan per capita  248  2.802550  3.180300  0.512620  18.253200 
TVE credits per capita   177  0.101137  0.143750  0.000021  0.703850 
PRV credits per capita  168  0.025116  0.036316  0.001274  0.252479 
FOR credits per capita  163  0.049691  0.100387  0.000072  0.691445
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Table 5 Financial indicators: credits to private and individual enterprises (cp), to 
township and village enterprises (ct), and to foreign funded enterprises 
(cf)
    Sys. GMM (Roodman extension)  
  (9)  (10)  (11)
l.y  0.0524***  0.0638***  0.0633*** 
  (0.069)  (0.062)  (0.069) 
l.Edu.   0.0378  0.0451  0.0477 
  (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.030) 
l.Gov.  0.0332  0.0504  0.0285 
  (0.030)  (0.036)  (0.035) 
l.Pop.  -0.0101  -0.0270  -0.0129 
  (0.249)  (0.226)  (0.261) 
l.State  -0.0095  -0.0117  -0.0066 
  (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.043) 
l.Trade  -0.0203  -0.0253*  -0.0253 
  (0.019)  (0.013)  (0.021) 
l.FDI  0.0397**  0.0288  0.0258 
  (0.018)  (0.017)  (0.019) 
l.NPC  -0.0899**  -0.1044**  -0.0831* 
  (0.038)  (0.051)  (0.043) 
l.FDI * l.NPC  -0.0064  -0.0074  -0.0053 
  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.006) 
l.CP  0.0357*     
  (0.018)     
l.CT    0.0357   
    (0.023)   
l.CF       0.0168 
      (0.021) 
l.FDI * l.CP  0.0065     
  (0.004)     
l.FDI * l.CT    0.0040   
    (0.005)   
l.FDI * l.CF      0.0028 
      (0.004) 
N  132  132  132 
M2  0.575  0.468  0.487 
Sargan   136.81  129.29  133.06 
No. Instru.  83  83  83 
F  11974.0912  42318.2390  15105.7324 
Note: all system GMM estimators are one-step estimators. *, **, *** represent significance level 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. All year 
dummies are omitted from the result table to save space.    29
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Table 6 Financial indicators: credits to private and individual enterprises (cp), to 
township and village enterprises (ct), and to foreign funded enterprises 
(cf) 
  (Dependent variable:  1 , , − − t i t i y y  , growth of real GDP per capita)
    Sys. GMM (Roodman extension)  
  (12)  (13)  (14)
l.y  0.0041***  0.0348***  0.0122*** 
  (0.075)  (0.060)  (0.082) 
l.Edu.   0.0343  0.0769***  0.0593 
  (0.030)  (0.029)  (0.037) 
l.Gov.  0.0071  0.0206  0.0030 
  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.029) 
l.Pop.  0.0173  0.0671  -0.0304 
  (0.273)  (0.240)  (0.270) 
l.State  -0.0172  -0.0524  -0.0405 
  (0.044)  (0.049)  (0.051) 
l.Trade  -0.0288  -0.0449**  -0.0288 
  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.028) 
l.FDI  0.0466**  0.0387***  0.0220 
  (0.019)  (0.013)  (0.017) 
l.NPC  -0.0546  -0.0761  -0.0227 
  (0.041)  (0.050)  (0.041) 
l.FDI * l.NPC  -0.0107**  -0.0098*  -0.0033 
  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.008) 
l.CP  0.0516**     
  (0.021)     
l.CT    0.0628**   
    (0.027)   
l.CF       0.0202 
      (0.021) 
l.FDI * l.CP  0.0080*     
  (0.005)     
l.FDI * l.CT    0.0095*   
    (0.005)   
l.FDI * l.CF      0.0043 
      (0.004) 
N  142  147  138 
M2  0.612  0.853  0.641 
Sargan   131.86  126.94  141.12 
No. Instru.  78  78  78 
F  7959.73  16220.13  22475.94
Note: all system GMM estimators are one-step estimators. *, **, *** represent significance level 
at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. All year 
dummies are omitted from the result table to save space.
  30
Asia Pacific Economic Papers
Notes
1    The author would like to thank Jenny Corbett, Emma Aisbett, Trevor Breusch, Jane Golley, 
and Ligang Song for helpful comments. Correspondence e-mail: ying.xu@anu.edu.au.
2   Also, Hale and Long (2007)’s review of the empirical evidence of FDI spillovers, productiv-
ity impacts of FDI, suggest the results are mixed in China. 
3   IMF classification of transition economies is referred to (IMF 2000). 
4   The private credit ratio is defined here as the ratio of credits to the private sector to GDP. 
5   Securities (bond and stock) markets are still in their early stage of development in China. 
Equity depth is only 17 percent of GDP, compared to 56 percent in India and 161 percent 
in Malaysia). Corporate bonds available on the market are just 1 percent of GDP (MGI 
2006).
6   Although three policy banks were established in 1994 to free commercial banks from ‘direct 
credit’, Wong and Wong (2001) argue as the policy banks lack sufficient branch networks 
or capital to achieve the task, the state commercial banks continued to engage in policy 
lending one way or another. Boyreau-Debray (2003) provides statistics to show that the 
government uses the state-owned banks as a policy instrument to support the state sector. 
Park and Sehrt (2001) also find evidence that the central government channels banking 
loans from rich provinces to SOEs of poor provinces for tackling the political concern of 
regional inequality.
7   In Mankiw et al. (1992) and others, income growth is observed over a frequency of five 
to ten years so the steady-state values are constructed using average values of each period. 
However, lack of financial market data confines the study to a total observation period of 
eight years. So annual growth is studied and the initial values of the determinants are taken 
as steady-state values.       
8   The most recent examples are Guillaumont Jeanneney et al. (2005) and Guariglia and Poncet 
(2007). 
9   In general, taking GDP ratios on a variable does not change its coefficients. In a simple 
form,
 




α α α = = − .
  When interaction terms are included, coefficients of the variables involved change funda-
mentally and the coefficients associated with levels cannot be calculated using coefficients 
of the ratios.
 
ln ln ln ln( )ln( )
W X W X
y
GDP GDP GDP GDP
β γ δ       = + +            
10   Price indexes of trade, FDI inflows and financial values are not available in the provincial 
level. Local GDP deflators are used as proxies. Assumptions associated with this simplifica-
tion can be found in Bayoumi and Lipworth (1998).
11  The ‘dynamic panel bias’ (Nickell 1981; Roodman 2006) is essentially an endogeneity 
problem, i.e. the lagged dependent variable, one of the regressors, is correlated with the 
error term, which is inherent in the model structure. 
12  Hsiao (1986) shows that in an AR(1) model which is equivalent to (2), OLS estimate of     
is biased upwards in the presence of individual-specific effects. Nickell (1981) suggests 
Within-group estimate of   is biased downward in short panels. 
13  For simplicity, the two methodologies are subsequently referred to as Difference GMM and 
System GMM estimation methodologies.31
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14  it x
 
is strictly exogenous if  [ ] 0 = i s itu x E  for all t  and s ;  it x  is predetermined if  [ ] 0 ≠ i s itu x E  
for  t s <  but  [ ] 0 = i s itu x E  for all  t s ≥ ;  it x  is endogenous if  [ ] 0 ≠ i s itu x E  for  t s ≤  but     
[ ] 0 = i s itu x E
 
for all  t s > .
15  The initial condition are that the panel level effects the panel level effects are uncorrelated 
with the first difference of the first observation of the dependent variable:  0 ] [ 2 = ∆ i i y E η  for 
N i ,..., 1 = . Bond et al. (2001) suggest that the initial conditions are potentially consistent 
with standard growth frameworks. 
16  A complete instrument matrix








i i L i
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  d i Z
 
is the matrix of GMM-type instruments created for the differenced equations,  L i Z  is 
the matrix of GMM-type instruments for the level equations,  i D  is the standard instruments 




is the standard instruments for the differenced errors and 
L
i I  is the standard instruments 
for the level errors.
17  How  orthogonal  deviations  can  minimize  data  loss  is  explained  in  Roodman  (2006; 
2007).
18  Another option for small private enterprises is to surrender partial or whole control for the 
foreign capital to form joint-ventures or wholly-owned foreign enterprises. In both cases, 
they are no longer identified as PRVs.
19  Financial institutions include banks, saving deposit agencies of postal offices, housing saving 
banks, urban and rural credit cooperatives, urban credit banks, financial trust investment 
agencies and finance companies. 
20  The computer package can produce both one-step and two-step estimators using differ-
ence/system GMM estimation methods. One-step GMM estimators are based on the as-
sumption of homoscedastic error terms, while two-step estimators have no assumption on 
the error term and often considered as asymptotically more efficient. However, Bond et 
al. (2001) suggests that the asymptotic standard errors associated with the two-step GMM 
estimators can be seriously biased downwards in finite samples and thus form an unreliable 
guide for inference. Given the dataset employed in this study is a small finite sample, one-
step estimators are reported.  
21  Another main destination of bank credit at the local level is large infrastructure projects, 
which however generates more of political credits for local politician rather than local 
economy (Yu 2009). 
22  Regressions without the variable of total credits are examined as well, but there are no 
significant results generated for all three sub-groups of private credits. It is suspected that 
the private credit variable may pick up the negative effects of SOE credits, which reduce 
any positive effects private credits could have. 
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